Peirce's strength, when he invented semiotics, was to conceive of signs on the basis of images and their combinations, not as a function of determinants which were already lingusitic. This led him to the most extraordinary classification of images and signs, of which we offer only a brief summary. Peirce begins with the image, from the phenomenon or from what appears. The image seems to him to be of three kinds, no more: firstness (something that only refers to itself, quality or power, pure possibility; for instance, the red that we find identical to itself in the proposition 'You have not put on your red dress' or 'You are in red'); secondness (something that refers to itself only through something else, existence, action-reaction, effort-resistance); thirdness (something that refers to itself only by comparing one thing to another, relation, the law, the necessary). It will be noted that the three kinds of images are not simply ordinal - first, second, third — but cardinal: there are two in the second, to the point where there is a firstness in the secondness, and there are three in the third. If the third marksrthe culmination, it is because it cannot be made up with dyads, but also because combinations of triads on their own or with the other modes can produce any multiplicity. This said, the sign in Peirce apparently combines the three kinds of image, but not in any kind of way: the sign is an image which stands for another image (its object), through the relation of a third image which constitutes 'its interpretant', this in turn being a sign, and so on to infinity. Hence Peirce, by combining the three modes of the image and the three aspects of the sign, produces nine sign elements, and ten corresponding signs (because all the combinations of elements are not logically possible).10 If we ask what the function of the sign is in relation to the image, it seems to be a cognitive one: not that the sign makes it object known; on the contrary, it presupposes knowledge of the object in another sign, but adds new elements of knowledge to it as a function of the interpretant. It is like two processes to infinity. Or rather, what amounts to the same thing, the sign's function must be said to

'make relations efficient': not that relations and laws lack actuality qua images, but they still lack that efficiency which makes them act 'when necessary', and that only knowledge gives them." But, on this basis, Peirce can sometimes find himself as much a linguist as the semiologists. For, if the sign elements still imply no privilege for language, this is no longer the case with the sign, and linguistic signs are perhaps the only ones to constitute a pure knowledge, that is, to absorb and reabsorb the whole content of the image as consciousness or appearance. They do not let any material that cannot be reduced to an utterance survive, and hence reintroduce a subordination of semiotics to a language system. Peirce would thus not have maintained his original position for very long; he would have given up trying to make semiotics a 'descriptive science of reality' (logic).

This is because, in his phenomenology, he claims the three types of image as a fact, instead of deducing them. We saw in Volume 1 that firstness, secondness and thirdness corresponded to the affection-image, the action-image and the relation-image. But all three are deduced from the movement-image as material, as soon as it is related to the interval of movement. Now this deduction is possible only if we first assume a perception-image. Of course, perception is strictly identical to every image, in so far as every image acts and reacts on all the others, on all their sides and in all their parts. But, when they are related to the interval of movement which separates, within one image, a received and an executed movement, they now vary only in relation to this one image, which will be called 'perceiving' the movement received, on one of its sides, and 'carrying out' the movement executed, on another side or in other parts. A special perception-image is therefore formed, an image which no longer simply expresses movement, but the relation between movement and the interval of movement. If the movement-image is already perception, the perception-image will be perception of perception, and perception will have two poles, depending on whether it is identified with movement or with its interval (variation of all the images in their relations with each other, or variation of all the images in relation to one of them). And perception will not constitute a first |>pe of image in the movement-image without being extended 'nto the other types, if there are any: perception of action, of affection, of relation, etc. The perception-image will therefore be I'ke a degree zero in the deduction which is carried out as a hinction of the movement-image: there will be a 'zeroness' before

Peirce's firstness. As for the question: are there types of image in the movement-image other than the perception-image?, it is resolved by the various aspects of the interval: the perception-image received movement on one side, but the affection-image is what occupies the interval (firstness), the action-image what executes the movement on the other side (secondness), and the relation-image what reconstitutes the whole of the movement with all the aspects of the interval (thirdness functioning as closure of the deduction). Thus the movement-image gives rise to a sensory-motor whole which grounds narration in the image.

Between the perception-image and the others, there is no intermediary, because perception extends by itself into the other images. But, in the other cases, there is necessarily an intermediary which indicates the extension as passage.12 This is why, in the end, we find ourselves faced with six types of perceptible visible images that we see, not three: perception-image, affection-image, impulse-image (intermediates between affection and action), action-image, re/lection-image (intermediate between action and relation), relation-image. And since, on the one hand, deduction constitutes a genesis of types, and, on the other, its degree zero, the perception-image, gives the others a bipolar composition appropriate to each case, we shall find ourselves with at least two signs of composition, and at least one sign of genesis for each type of image. We therefore take the term 'sign' in a completely different way from Peirce: it is a particular image that refers to a type of image, whether from the point of view of its bipolar composition, or from the point of view of its genesis. It is clear that all this involves the discussion in Volume 1 : the reader may, then, skip it, as long as he keeps in mind the recapitulation of signs set out earlier, where we borrowed from Peirce a certain number of terms whilst changing their meaning. Thus the signs of composition for the perception-image are the dicisign and the reume. The dicisign refers to a perception of perception, and usually appears in cinema when the camera 'sees' a character who is seeing; it implies a firm frame, and so constitutes a kind of solid state of perception. But the reume refers to a fluid or liquid perception which passes continuously through the frame. The engramme, finally, is the genetic sign or the gaseous state of perception, molecular perception, which the two others presuppose. The affection-image has the icon as sign of composition, which can be of quality or of power; it is a quality or a power which are only expressed (for example, a face) without being actualized.

But it is the qualisign or the potisign which constitute the genetic element because they construct quality or power in an any-space-whatever, that is, in a space that does not yet appear as a real setting. The impulse-image, intermediate between affection and action, is composed of fetishes, fetishes of Good or Evil: these are fragments torn from a derived setting, but which refer genetically to the symptom of an originary world operating below the setting. The action-image implies a real actualized setting which has become sufficient, so that a global situation will provoke an action, or on the contrary an action will disclose a part of the situation: the two signs of composition, therefore, are the synsign and the index. The internal link between situation and action, in any case, constitutes the genetic element or the imprint. The reflection-image, which goes from action to relation, is composed when action and situation enter into indirect relations: the signs are then figures, of attraction or inversion. And the genetic sign is diicursive, that is, a situation or an action of discourse, independent of the question: is the discourse itself realized in a language? Finally, the relation-image relates movement to the whole that it expresses, and makes the whole vary according to the distribution of movement: the two signs of composition will be the mark, or the circumstance, through which two images are united, according to a habit ('natural' relation), and the demark, the circumstance through which an image finds itself torn from its natural relation or series; the sign of genesis the symbol, the circumstance through which we are made to compare two images, even arbitrarily united ('abstract' relation).

The movement-image is matter [matière] itself, as Bergson showed. It is a matter that is not linguistically formed, although it is semiotically, and constitutes the first dimension of semiotics. In fact, the different kinds of image which are necessarily deduced from the movement-image, the six kinds, are the elements that make this matter into a signaletic material [matière signalétique]. And the signs themselves are the features of expression that compose and combine these images, and constantly re-create them, borne or carted along by matter in movement [la matière en mouvement].

A final problem then arises: why does Peirce think that everything ends with thirdness and the relation-image and that there is nothing beyond? This is undoubtedly true from the point of view of the movement-image: this is framed by the relations which relate it to the whole that it expresses, so much so that a logic of relations seems to close the transformations of the movement-image by determining the corresponding changes of the whole. We have seen, in this sense, that a cinema like that of Hitchcock, taking relation as its explicit object, completed the circuit of the movement-image and brought to its logical perfection what could be called classical cinema. But we have encountered signs which, eating away at the action-image, also brought their effect to bear above and below, on perception and relation, and called into question the movement-image as a whole: these are opsigns or sonsigns. The interval of movement was no longer that in relation to which the movement-image was specified as perception-image, at one end of the interval, as action-image at the other end, and as affection-image between the two, so as to constitute a sensory-motor whole. On the contrary the sensory-motor link was broken, and the interval of movement produced the appearance as such of an image other than the movement-image. Sign and image thus reversed their relation, because the sign no longer presupposed the movement-image as material that it represented in its specified forms, but set about presenting the other image whose material it was itself to specify, and forms it was to constitute, from sign to sign. This was the second dimension of pure, non-linguistic semiotics. There was to arise a whole series of new signs, constitutive of a transparent material, or of a time-image irreducible to the movement-image, but not without a determinable relationship with it. We could no longer consider Peirce's thirdness as a limit of the system of images and signs, because the opsign (or sonsign) set everything off again, from the inside.

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